

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

James D. Cooper,) C/A No.: 9:09-2757-HFF-BM
vs. Plaintiff,)
Marty Estla;)
Synthia Williams;) Report and Recommendation
Jammie Smith;)
Grand Careway,)
Defendants.)

This matter is before the court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiff is proceeding *pro se*. Plaintiff, who was formerly a prisoner, essentially seeks compensation for his incarceration. In his pleading he states he spent time “in Williamsburg and Sumter County because I walked back and forth to the child support office asking ‘what did they have on me?’ and they said ‘nothing.’” He also alleges in his pleading that the “[d]efendant testified today and did not deny coming about the plaintiff.” Additionally he states “they” were supposed to “throw the CDV out” because the plaintiff did not appear. He maintains “no one sits in jail not knowing their time”, and he claims “they” neglected him and discriminated against him, but he provides no more information regarding these claims. He refers to his attorney, but doesn’t name him in the “caption” of his case. He states “they” didn’t offer him anger management class.

The attachments plaintiff submits along with his pleading are more helpful . They show that the plaintiff was charged with criminal domestic violence (CDV), violation of a court order of protection, malicious injury to real property and resisting arrest, and cruelty to children. He does not allege that any of his convictions or sentences were reversed, expunged, or declared invalid by a state court, and no federal writ of habeas corpus has been issued.

[Handwritten signatures/initials: RS, CY]

Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the *pro se* complaint pursuant to the procedural provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915, 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, and the Prison Litigation Reform Act. The review has been conducted in light of the following precedents: *Denton v. Hernandez*, 504 U.S. 25 (1992); *Neitzke v. Williams*, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989); *Haines v. Kerner*, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); *Nasim v. Warden, Maryland House of Correction*, 64 F.3d 951 (4th Cir. 1995) (*en banc*); *Todd v. Baskerville*, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1983); and *Boyce v. Alizaduh*, 595 F.2d 948 (4th Cir. 1979). *Pro se* complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys, *Gordon v. Leake*, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir.), and a federal district court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a *pro se* litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. See *Hughes v. Rowe*, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980); and *Cruz v. Beto*, 405 U.S. 319 (1972). When a federal court is evaluating a *pro se* complaint the plaintiff's allegations are assumed to be true. *Fine v. City of N. Y.*, 529 F.2d 70, 74 (2nd Cir. 1975). However, even under this less stringent standard, the complaint submitted in the above-captioned case is subject to summary dismissal. The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. *Weller v. Department of Soc. Servs.*, 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).

Insofar as the plaintiff's convictions, related state court proceedings, and arrests are concerned, the § 1983 complaint is subject to summary dismissal because a right of action has not yet accrued. See *Heck v. Humphrey*, 512 U.S. 477 (1994):

We hold that, in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, . . . a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such a determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983. Thus, when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in

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favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.


Heck v. Humphrey, supra. See also Schafer v. Moore, 46 F.3d 43 (8th Cir. 1995)("Therefore, in light of *Heck*, the complaint was properly dismissed for failure to state a claim."); and *Woods v. Candela*, 47 F.3d 545 (2nd Cir. 1995)(*per curium*)(plaintiff's conviction reversed by state court in 1993; hence, civil rights action timely filed). *See also Brooks v. City of Winston-Salem, N.C.*, 85 F.3d 178 (4th Cir. 1996). *Accord Smith v. Holtz*, 879 F. Supp. 435 (M.D.Pa., March 24, 1995); *Burnside v. Mathis*, 2004 WL 2944092 (D.S.C. 2004).

Since the plaintiff has failed to establish that his convictions have been reversed, expunged, or declared invalid by a state court, and no federal writ of habeas corpus has been issued, this action must be dismissed for failure to state a claim.

RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, it is recommended that the District Court dismiss the complaint in the above-captioned case *without prejudice* and without issuance and service of process. *See Denton v. Hernandez, supra; Neitzke v. Williams, supra; Haines v. Kerner, supra; Brown v. Briscoe*, 998 F.2d 201, 202-204 & n.* (4th Cir. 1993), replacing unpublished opinion originally tabled at 993 F.2d 1535 (4th Cir. 1993); *Boyce v. Alizaduh, supra; Todd v. Baskerville, supra*, 712 F.2d at 74; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A [the court shall review, as soon as practicable after docketing, prisoner cases to determine whether they are subject to any grounds for dismissal].

February 25, 2010
Charleston, South Carolina


Bristow Marchant
United States Magistrate Judge

The plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.

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Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation

The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.’” *Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co.*, 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee’s note).

Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); *see* Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:

Larry W. Propes, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402

Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); *Thomas v. Arn*, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); *Wright v. Collins*, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); *United States v. Schronce*, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).

